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Abstract 
The relationships between mating decisions and parental investment are central to evolution, but to date 
few theoretical treatments of their co-evolution have been developed. Here we adopt a demographically 
explicit, adaptive dynamics approach to analyse the co-evolution of female mating decisions and parental 
investment of both sexes in a self-consistent way. Our models predict that where females cannot interfere 
with one another’s mating decisions, and where they do not differ in their survival- and fecundity 
prospects, monogamy should be rare, and favoured only under harsh environmental conditions, in sparse 
populations. However, allowing for interference or asymmetries among females leads to selection for 
monogamy over a much broader range of environments and demographies. Interference by paired, 
resident females may prevent unmated rivals from joining existing monogamous pairs, thus barring the 
formation of polygynous groups. Asymmetries between established, primary females and subsequently 
joining secondary females may increase the relative costs of early polygynous reproduction compared to 
delayed monogamy for the latter. The models thus highlight different routes by which monogamy may 
evolve. We further track how parental investment by the sexes co-evolves with female mating decisions, 
highlighting how sexual conflict over parental investment is both cause and effect of mating behaviour.  
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Introduction  
The range of animal mating systems, from extreme polygamy to life-time monogamy, has intrigued 
evolutionary biologists for over a century (Shuster and Wade 2003). The broad body of work that has 
emerged as a result of these research efforts suggests that mating system evolution is intertwined with a 
wide array of ecological traits (Shuster and Wade 2003). Among others, feedbacks have been suggested 
between mating and (i) brain size (Dunbar and Shultz 2007), (ii) demography (Lukas and Clutton-Brock 
2013), (iii) sociality (Boomsma 2013), and (iv) life-history (Bonduriansky et al. 2008).  
The one trait that is identified as important to mating system evolution in all studies is parental 
investment (Trivers 1972). The reason is that the main cost of increased parental investment, e.g. in the 
form of extended parental care, is a lowered rate of reproduction, while, conversely, the pursuit of a 
higher mating rate may result in insufficient parental investment and the failure of reproductive attempts 
(Shuster and Wade 2003), (Alonzo 2010). Consequently, individuals are expected to try to maximise their 
own mating rate at the expense of their mates, either by shifting the load of parental investment towards 
their partners or by increasing the number of partners they mate with (Chapman et al. 2003), (Parker 
2006), (Harrison et al. 2009). This issue lies at the core of the fields of the evolution of (a) mating systems 
(Shuster and Wade 2003), (b) sexual conflict (Chapman 2006), and (c) parental care (Royle et al. 2012).  
Much theoretical work has tried to unravel the causal relationships between sexual selection, 
mating system evolution, and parental investment (reviewed e.g. in: (Kokko and Jennions 2008), (Kokko 
et al. 2012), (Houston et al. 2013)). Most modelling approaches, however, do not include simultaneous 
feedback loops between (a) demography, (b) the mating system, and (c) parental investment strategies 
(but see (Dillard and Westneat 2016), (Fromhage and Jennions 2016) for notable exceptions). In addition, 
most models focus on one or two specific aspects of mating and parenting and treat all other parameters 
as fixed. These focal traits include, but are not limited to, (i) physiological or behavioural sex differences 
(e.g. anisogamy or sex-differential mobility), (ii) operational or adult sex ratios (OSR and ASR, respectively), 
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and (iii) conflicts within and among the sexes (e.g. sperm competition or conflicts over care). The narrow 
focus of many existing models has led several authors to argue for more holistic and inclusive theoretical 
approaches (e.g. (Székely et al. 2000), (Alonzo 2010), (Dillard and Westneat 2016)). The most explicit of 
these suggestions comes from (Houston et al. 2013) when they say that ‘A full model of parental care 
should be put in the context of life history and ecology, and ultimately have the OSR, extrapair copulations 
and paternity, mating preferences, mate choice behaviour and care behaviour emerge in a holistic and 
consistent manner’. This statement is not specific to models of parental care, but rather applies to 
theoretical approaches investigating any of the biological aspects they list. 
Here we report on our development of one such model. We do not incorporate all the parameters 
requested by (Houston et al. 2013) (see Methods for a complete list of included parameters), but we 
present a game-theoretical approach in which both the mating system and parental investment strategies 
co-evolve in a demographically explicit setting (Figure 1). The work is broadly based on classic approaches 
to mating system evolution (Orians 1969), (Emlen and Oring 1977), (Maynard Smith 1977), (Shuster and 
Wade 2003), but extends these models by applying an adaptive dynamics approach and allowing for 
parental investment to co-evolve with mating decisions (Dieckmann and Law 1996), (Dercole and Rinaldi 
2008).  
As in classic models of the polygyny threshold, we suppose that an unmated female encounters 
potential breeding males sequentially (at a rate proportional to their density). Because engaging in 
polygyny is potentially costly, due to a reduction in the amount of paternal investment obtained, a female 
that encounters a male who is already mated can decide to continue searching for an unpaired male or to 
accept polygyny and start breeding. Thus, the mating system, i.e. the proportions of monogamously and 
polygynously paired males, emerges from female mating decisions, and these are (partly) based on 
demography and male and female parental investment strategies. In turn, both demography and male 
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and female investment behaviour are (partly) determined by females’ mating decisions, closing the 
feedback loop.  
 
Methods 
Model Names & Aims 
Below we explore four different model variants, which we will refer to as Models 1-4: a basic variant 
(Model 1), and three extensions (Models 2, 3 and 4), each of which considers a different potential 
evolutionary route to monogamy.  
Model 2 allows for interference by established monogamously breeding females (‘residents’ or 
‘primary’ females) in attempts of floating females (potential ‘joiners’ or ‘secondary’ females) to join 
existing pairs. We reason that, where polygyny is potentially costly to females, monogamously paired 
females may benefit from resisting being joined by another female, e.g. by aggressing potential joiners or 
inhibiting their mates’ ability to attract another female (Eggert and Sakaluk 1995), (Kempenaers 1995), 
(Sandell and Smith 1997), (Grønstøl et al. 2003). We model the impact of this interference by assuming 
that the probability of an unmated female joining a mated pair depends upon a weighted average of the 
fitness impact of this event on both the resident and the joining female, with the weighting coefficient 
reflecting the relative power of the two females in question (see below for details).  
Models 3 and 4 allow for asymmetries between a male’s first, primary (resident) mate, and any 
subsequent, secondary mate. We reason that initially monogamously paired females and those that join 
a monogamous pair may differ in their fitness prospects, even though they breed alongside each other in 
the same polygynous group, due to, e.g., differential access to resources within the territory or differential 
investment by the male (Simmons et al. 1985), (Burley 1988), (Huk and Winkel 2006). We explore two 
such possible asymmetries in the fitness prospects of residents and joiners in Models 3 and 4: joiners 
either suffer from lower fecundity (Model 3) or from increased mortality risk (Model 4). 
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Overview of Model 1 
We assume a sexual population of infinite size in which breeding occurs in territories, while non-breeding 
individuals aggregate in non-localised, sex-specific floater communities (Figure 1). We further assume that 
each territory can support only one male and up to two females and that all territories are of the same 
quality. Also, all individuals of identical sex and status (i.e. of the same type or class, see below) are of the 
same quality. We model the dynamics of the population, i.e. deaths, births, and status changes, in 
continuous time. 
Newly born individuals become floaters and must wait for a vacancy in a territory before they can 
reproduce. Once an individual acquires breeding status, it remains on its territory until it dies. However, 
settling in a territory is not guaranteed, as floaters may die before they encounter a territory vacancy. 
Vacancies arise whenever a territorial individual dies. Vacancies for males are immediately taken 
up by floaters, while floating females encounter territories at a rate proportional to their density. This 
allows for the occurrence of territories occupied by only a solitary male, by a male and a female, or by a 
male and two females. There are no territories occupied by a solitary female or wholly unoccupied 
territories.  
Upon encountering a solitary male, female floaters will always occupy the associated vacancy to 
form a monogamous pair. Female floaters that encounter a territory already occupied by a male and a 
female, however, will only join the focal monogamous pair to form a polygynous group, if doing so yields 
higher expected fitness than remaining a floater. This assessment of fitness consequences is assumed to 
be imperfect (see below). 
In total, seven classes of individuals exist in the model (floating males, floating females, solitary 
males, monogamous males, monogamous females, polygynous males, females in polygynous groups). 
Breeding females, i.e. females in a territory, constantly produce offspring at a specified rate, but offspring 
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survival (and thus adult fitness) is determined by the parental investment of both parents. Adult mortality 
is determined by individual class and parental investment expended. This way, we implement a trade-off 
between adult survival (which is increased by decreasing parental investment) and reproduction (which 
is increased by increasing parental investment). 
 
Population dynamics 
At demographic equilibrium, the frequencies of breeding territories supporting a solitary male, a 
monogamous pair, or a polygynous group, respectively, and the densities of female and of male floaters 
are all stable due to an equilibrium of deaths, births, and status changes. Throughout this paper, we 
denote densities of floaters as 𝐿𝑚 (males) and 𝐿𝑓 (females; i.e. subscripted letters indicate sex; both 
densities are measured as floaters per breeding territory; Figure 1). We further denote the frequency of 
territories as 𝐵0  for those occupied by a solitary male, 𝐵1  for those occupied by a monogamous pair, and  
𝐵2   for those occupied by a polygynous group (i.e. subscripted numbers signify the number of females in 
a given breeding territory). The sex ratio of offspring produced (see below; denoted as 𝜃: proportion of 
males) and the rate at which females encounter territories (see above; denoted as 𝜀̂) are fixed globally.  
We allow for different mortalities for individuals of different sex and status (i.e. there are class-
specific mortalities); floating males suffer mortality rate µ𝑚𝐿, while the mortality of solitary, 
monogamous, and polygynous males is denoted as µ𝑚𝐵0, µ𝑚𝐵1, and µ𝑚𝐵2, respectively. The mortality of 
female floaters is denoted µ𝑓𝐿, and monogamous females and females in polygynous groups suffer 
mortality rate µ𝑓𝐵1 and µ𝑓𝐵2, respectively. All mortality rates are calculated as functions of a baseline 
mortality (µ̂𝑚𝐿, µ̂𝑓𝐿, µ̂𝑚𝐵, µ̂𝑓𝐵) and the respective parental investment expended by individuals of that 
sex and status (see below). 
We model reproduction as a function of a global rate of producing offspring (𝛾) and the parental 
investment expended by both parents (total parental investment). Hence, 𝛾𝐵1 denotes the rate of 
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production of surviving offspring for a monogamous female, and 𝛾𝐵2 denotes the rate of production of 
surviving offspring for a female in a polygynous group (see below). This allows us to simulate 
environments of different overall productivity/harshness and their impact on the evolution of mating 
decisions and parental investment (see below and Supplementary Material for details): larger values of 𝛾 
increase the rate at which females produce offspring, representing less harsh (and thus more productive) 
environments. See Figure 1 for a schematic overview of the changes in the frequency of territory types 
and the densities of floaters. 
 
Reproductive value calculations 
In the model, the reproductive value of an individual of any particular class is proportional to the number 
of surviving offspring expected to be produced over that individual’s life span (note that all surviving 
offspring join the floater pool at birth, and so are of equal expected value). While only paired individuals, 
i.e. males and females in monogamous pairs or polygynous groups, actually produce offspring, solitary 
males as well as floating males and females are expected to reach breeding status with certain 
probabilities. Consequently, all classes of individuals have non-zero expected value, denoted as 𝑊𝑚𝐿 
(floating males), 𝑊𝑚𝐵0 (solitary males), 𝑊𝑚𝐵1  (monogamous males), 𝑊𝑚𝐵2 (polygynous males), 𝑊𝑓𝐿 
(floating females), 𝑊𝑓𝐵1 (monogamous females), 𝑊𝑓𝐵2 (females in polygynous groups), respectively. For 
each class of individual, we calculate the expected future offspring by summing over all possible events 
(death, status change, reproduction), weighted according to their probabilities of occurrence. For 
example, a solitary male is either joined by a floating female, thus changing his status to that of 
monogamous male (at rate 𝜀̂ ∗ 𝐿𝑓 ∗ 𝐵0 ∗ 1/𝐵0, resulting in him obtaining a monogamous male’s expected 
number of future offspring 𝑊𝑚𝐵1), or he dies (at rate µ𝑚𝐵0, resulting in him receiving no future offspring); 
a solitary male’s value thus satisfies the equation: 
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Eq. 1: 𝑊𝑚𝐵0 =
?̂?∗𝐿𝑓∗𝐵0∗
1
𝐵0
∗𝑊𝑚𝐵1+0∗µ𝑚𝐵0
?̂?∗𝐿𝑓∗𝐵0∗
1
𝐵0
+µ𝑚𝐵0
  
which simplifies to: 
Eq. 2: 𝑊𝑚𝐵0 =
?̂?∗𝐿𝑓∗𝑊𝑚𝐵1
?̂?∗𝐿𝑓+µ𝑚𝐵0
 
See Supplement 5 for a complete list of comparable reproductive value equations, which can be jointly 
solved to obtain expressions for the value of each class of individual as a function of other model 
parameters. 
 
Evolution of parental investment 
In order to model the evolution of parental investment, we use an adaptive dynamics approach with 
separation of ecological and evolutionary time scales (Dieckmann and Law 1996). Thus, we make two key 
assumptions: first, parental investment expended by a mutant invading the resident population is only 
marginally different from that expended by residents. Second, competition among invading mutants and 
residents, and the ensuing changes in frequency, occur over a much shorter time span (ecological or 
demographic time scale) than the interval at which new mutations arise and invade the population 
(evolutionary time scale). Consequently, we model evolution as a step-wise process in which the 
population is always quasi-monomorphic and at demographic equilibrium (Dieckmann and Law 1996). 
In the current manuscript, investment in parenting is the focus of a trade-off between 
reproduction and survival: mortality rates are accelerating functions of parental investment, while rates 
of production of surviving offspring are saturating functions of parental investment. For example, 
mortality of monogamous females is given as:  
 
Eq. 3: µ𝑓𝐵1 = µ̂𝑓𝐵 + (𝐶𝑓𝐵1)
2 
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where µ̂𝑓𝐵 is the baseline mortality of breeding females (see above) and 𝐶𝑓𝐵1 is the investment expended 
by monogamous females. Conversely, reproduction of surviving offspring by a monogamous female is 
given as: 
 
Eq. 4: 𝛾𝐵1 = 𝛾 ∗ (1 − 𝑒
−(𝐶𝑓𝐵1+𝐶𝑚𝐵1)) 
  
where 𝛾 is the global rate of producing offspring (see above), 𝐶𝑓𝐵1 is the parental investment by 
monogamous females, and 𝐶𝑚𝐵1 is the parental investment by monogamous males. See Supplement 4 
for a complete list of mortality and reproduction functions used in the current manuscript. 
 Given our adaptive dynamic assumptions, the rate of evolutionary change in the level of 
investment by any given class of individual is proportional to the relevant selection gradient, which we 
calculate as the partial derivative of mutant fitness (for an individual of that class) with respect to the focal 
individual’s own mutant investment level, assuming the population is at demographic equilibrium; 
expressions for mutant fitness are given in Supplement 7. Note that as all monogamous breeding pairs 
and polygynous groups are formed by individuals joining from the floater pool (i.e. there is no philopatry), 
group members are always unrelated. There is consequently no need to consider the impact on the fitness 
of a focal mutant of correlated changes in the phenotype of other group members.  
 
Evolution of mating decisions 
We assume that the mating system is a result of females’ acceptance of polygynous matings. Explicitly, 
we consider the ratio of monogamously to polygynously mated males as indicative of the mating system, 
i.e. whether the species should be considered monogamous or polygynous. This ratio is determined in 
part by demographic effects, because monogamy may still be observed even when being strongly selected 
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against, simply because densities of floating females or encounter rates are too low. More interestingly, 
though, the mating system is determined by floating females’ willingness to join already established 
monogamous pairs to form polygynous groups. We model this decision as an adaptive behaviour in the 
sense that females choose whichever life history, remaining a floater or accepting polygyny, yields higher 
fitness. While this choice is by definition binary, we model it as a probability between 0 and 1, the actual 
value of which is calculated as: 
 
Eq. 5: 𝐽 =
1
1+𝑒
−?̂?∗(𝑊𝑓𝐵2−𝑊𝑓𝐿)
 
  
where 𝐽 is the probability that a floating female joins a monogamous pair, ?̂? is the accuracy with which a 
floating female can assess the fitness consequences of the decision, and 𝑊𝑓𝐵2 and 𝑊𝑓𝐿 is the expected 
fitness of a female in a polygynous group and a floating female, respectively. We do this for two reasons: 
first, it makes biological sense to assume that females are not able to perfectly assess the fitness 
consequences of their decision. In our model, however, we can investigate the influence of females’ 
decision making accuracy by altering how closely the sigmoidal curve approximates a step-function, i.e. a 
true binary decision, by changing the value of ?̂?. Second, by using a non-binary probability for joining, we 
can use an adaptive dynamics approach also for the evolution of the mating system (Dieckmann and Law 
1996). 
 
Solving the model 
We solve the model, given a certain set of globally specified environmental parameters (𝜀̂, 𝛾, 𝜃, etc., see 
above), by identifying a convergently stable, evolutionary equilibrium, at which the probability of a 
floating female joining a monogamous pair is optimal (subject to assessment error ?̂? as described above), 
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and selection gradients on the levels of parental investment by individuals of all classes (𝐶𝑚𝐿, 𝐶𝑓𝐿, 𝐶𝑚𝐵0, 
𝐶𝑚𝐵1, 𝐶𝑓𝐵1, 𝐶𝑚𝐵2, 𝐶𝑓𝐵2, respectively) are simultaneously equal to zero.  
Unfortunately, we are unable to solve the model analytically. Hence, to identify an equilibrium of 
the kind described above, we use an iterative solution procedure in which, starting with an arbitrary set 
of initial levels of parental investment, these values are repeatedly updated by adding to each a multiple 
of the selection gradient for the trait in question (and replacing the current joining probability with some 
weighted sum of the existing value and the error-prone optimum at the current demographic equilibrium; 
cf. Supplements 9 & 11). This procedure is repeated until convergence to an equilibrium, which we take 
to have been reached when the maximum change in any strategic variable from one iteration to the next 
falls below some small threshold value (cf. Supplement 20).  
 
Model 2 – allowing for interference among females 
Model 2 allows for interference by resident, primary females in the joining decisions of floater females. 
We do this by considering the fitness consequences of accepting polygyny by floaters (which become 
joiners (secondary females) upon accepting polygyny with probability 𝐽) for resident females. We thus 
change the way in which 𝐽 is determined: 
 
Eq. 6: 𝐽 =
1
1+𝑒
−?̂?((1−?̂?)(𝑊𝑓𝐵2−𝑊𝑓𝐿)+?̂?(𝑊𝑓𝐵2−𝑊𝑓𝐵1))
 
 
where 𝐽 is the probability that a floating female joins a monogamous pair, ?̂? is the accuracy with which 
females can assess the fitness consequences of the decision, ?̂? is the weight given to the fitness 
consequences of joining to resident females, and 𝑊𝑓𝐵2, 𝑊𝑓𝐿 , and 𝑊𝑓𝐵1 is the expected fitness of a female 
in a polygynous group, a floating female, and a monogamous female, respectively. Thus, high values of  ?̂? 
shift the values of 𝐽 towards the optimum for monogamous (resident, primary) females, while low values 
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shift 𝐽 towards the optimum for floaters (joiners or secondary females). Other than substituting Eq. 5 with 
Eq. 6, Models 1 and 2 are identical (hence, when setting ?̂? = 0, Models 1 and 2 are exactly equivalent). 
 
Model 3 – allowing for fecundity differences between resident females and joiners 
Model 3 introduces fecundity asymmetries between resident, primary females and joining, secondary 
females (which requires tracking eight classes of individual rather than seven; see Supplements 12-19 for 
details). Specifically, fecundity is calculated differently for residents (Eq. 7a) and joiners (Eq. 7b): 
 
Eq. 7a: 𝛾𝐵2𝑟 = 𝛾 ∗ (1 − 𝑒
−(𝐶𝑓𝐵2𝑟+𝐶𝑚𝐵2𝑟)) 
 
Eq. 7b: 𝛾𝐵2𝑗 = 𝛾 ∗ ?̂? ∗ (1 − 𝑒
−(𝐶𝑓𝐵2𝑗+𝐶𝑚𝐵2𝑗))  
 
where 𝛾 is the global base rate of offspring production, 𝐶𝑓𝐵2𝑟 is the parental investment of resident 
(primary) females in polygynous groups, 𝐶𝑚𝐵2𝑟 is the parental investment of polygynous males in  
offspring of resident females, ?̂? is the factor by which fecundity is multiplied for joiner (secondary) 
females compared to primary females, 𝐶𝑓𝐵2𝑗 is the parental investment of joiners, and 𝐶𝑚𝐵2𝑗 is the 
investment of polygynous males in offspring of joiner females. The lower the value of ?̂?, the more costly 
it is (in terms of relative fecundity reduction) for a floater female to accept polygyny (0 ≤ ?̂? ≤ 1). 
 
Model 4 - allowing for mortality differences between resident females and joiners 
Model 4 is similar to Model 3, except that there is no fecundity cost of joining (i.e. ?̂? = 1). Instead, 
secondary, joiner females incur mortality costs compared to primary, resident females. Mortality rates for 
residents (Eq. 8a) and joiners (Eq. 8b) are given by: 
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Eq. 8a: µ𝑓𝐵2𝑟 = µ̂𝑓𝐵 + (𝐶𝑓𝐵2𝑟)
2 
 
Eq. 8b: µ𝑓𝐵2𝑗 = µ̂𝑓𝐵 ∗ ?̂? + (𝐶𝑓𝐵2𝑗)
2 
 
where  µ̂𝑓𝐵 is the baseline mortality of breeding females (see above), 𝐶𝑓𝐵2𝑟 is the parental investment of 
resident females in polygynous groups, ?̂? is the factor by which baseline mortality is increased for joiners 
compared to other breeding females, and 𝐶𝑓𝐵2𝑗 is the parental investment expended by joiner females. 
The higher the value of  ?̂?, the greater the mortality costs of accepting polygyny for floaters compared to 
other breeding females (?̂? ≥ 1). 
 
Comparing the models 
In order to compare the predictions of the models with regards to evolving mating decisions and parental 
investment strategies, we evaluated all four models along the same environmental productivity gradient 
(i.e. setting 𝛾 to values from 4 to 12 – values lower than 4 always resulted in unviable populations and 
values larger than 12 did not qualitatively alter the outcomes of the models) with otherwise identical 
parameter values. Specifically, we used the following conditions for all four models: ?̂? = 40, 𝜀̂ = 20, 𝜃 =
0.5, µ̂𝑚𝐿 = 0.1, µ̂𝑓𝐿 = 0.1, µ̂𝑚𝐵 = 1, µ̂𝑓𝐵 = 1. We initiated the models with starting values for parental 
investment of all classes of individuals and joining probability set to 0.5 (in Models 3 and 4, polygynous 
males have two components to their parental investment (one expended towards offspring of resident 
females and one expended towards offspring of joiner females) and each was set to 0.25 for a total 
starting value of 0.5). We found that running the models for 150 iterations proved sufficient for them to 
converge when using a maximum difference between resident and mutant investments and joining 
probabilities of 0.1 (i.e. step size (𝑋), see Supplement 20). We thus ran the models for each value of 𝛾 for 
150 iterations (number of steps) with a step size (𝑋) of 0.1 (see Supplement 20). For the current 
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manuscript, we set ?̂? = 0.9 for Model 2. For Model 3, we set ?̂? = 0.5. For Model 4, we set ?̂? = 2. We thus 
compare the predictions of Model 1 (basic) to those of a situation (i) in which fitness consequences of 
joining decisions to resident females account for 90% of the selective pressure (Model 2 – interference), 
(ii) in which joiners have half the reproductive potential of other breeding females (Model 3 – reproductive 
costs), or (iii) in which joiners suffer twice the baseline mortality compared to other breeding females 
(Model 4 – mortality costs).  
Below, we explore how predicted outcomes vary along a gradient of environmental productivity, 
captured in the model by the baseline level of reproductive output (𝛾). We focus on this parameter in 
particular because it exerts a very strong influence on both female mating decisions (and hence on the 
mating system) and on parental investment. The effects of other ecological parameters, such as female 
mobility (𝜀̂), female decision making accuracy (?̂?), and baseline mortalities (µ̂𝑚𝐿, µ̂𝑓𝐿, µ̂𝑚𝐵, µ̂𝑓𝐵), which 
are much less pronounced, are explored in Supplements 21-25.  
 
Results 
The evolution of monogamy 
In all four models, adaptive monogamy (indicated by joining probabilities 𝐽 < 0.5, which imply a greater 
fitness payoff to remaining as a floater than to joining) is found in relatively unproductive environments, 
i.e. for those values of 𝛾 adjacent to the boundary of population extinction, which results in relatively 
sparse populations (cf. shaded areas in Figures 2 & 3). However, introducing interference or asymmetries 
among females extends the range of environments in which monogamy is favoured, with asymmetries 
having a stronger impact than interference (cf. the greater range of adaptive monogamy for Models 3 and 
4, compared to Model 2, compared to Model 1 in Figures 2 & 3). 
 
Sex ratios and mating decisions 
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As seen in Figure 2B, there are clear shifts in adult sex ratio (ASR; the proportion of all individuals in 
breeding patches and floater communities that are male) associated with the transition from monogamy 
to polygyny. However, there is no direct causal relationship between ASR and mating system: in our 
models, changes in sex ratio and female mating decisions both emerge from the interplay between the 
underlying demographic factors. Figure 2B reveals that as productivity increases, which intensifies female 
competition for mating opportunities and thus favours a switch from monogamy to polygyny, the ASR 
becomes more male biased. This reflects the fact, illustrated in Figure 3, that under polygyny a higher 
proportion of females than of males are able to become breeders, thereby incurring higher mortality rates 
than they would do as floaters (we assume µ̂𝑓𝐿 < µ̂𝑓𝐵 and µ̂𝑚𝐿 < µ̂𝑚𝐵, see above). The resulting sex-bias 
in mean mortality leads to a shift in the overall ratio of males to females. As productivity increases still 
further, however, the proportion of floaters of both sexes grows, diluting the impact of sex-differences in 
the number of breeders so that the ASR tends to decline back towards 1:1 (see Figures 2B and 3; see 
Supplement 25 for an additional discussion of sex ratios in our models). 
 
Mating decisions and total parental investment 
The total parental investment predicted by the models typically differs between monogamous pairs and 
polygynous groups (Figure 4). However, the form of these differences is dependent on the particular 
model under investigation: in Models 1 and 2, offspring produced in polygynous groups typically receive 
more parental investment than those produced in monogamous pairs, while the opposite is true for 
Models 3 and 4 (cf. intercepts in Figure 4). In other words, different routes to monogamy predict different 
patterns of parental investment in relation to mating status. Crucially, the way in which parental 
investment changes with transitions to polygyny is also fundamentally different between the different 
models: as monogamy becomes rarer, parental investment is generally reduced in Models 1 and 2, but 
increased in Models 3 and 4 (cf. slopes in Figure 4). 
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What is more, the type of asymmetry between resident (primary) and (secondary) joiner females 
in polygynous groups determines whether it matters to offspring if their mother is a resident or a joiner 
(cf. Figure 4B): when joiners suffer from reduced fecundity by comparison with residents, offspring of 
joiners receive markedly less parental investment than those of residents (due to a complete lack of 
paternal investment; cf. the discrepancy between the solid and the dashed-and-dotted lines in Figure 4B 
for Model 3). In contrast, if joiners suffer increased mortality by comparison with residents, offspring 
produced in polygynous groups receive the same amount of parental investment, irrespective of whether 
their mother is a resident or a joiner (cf. the perfect overlap of solid and dashed-and-dotted lines in Figure 
4B for Model 4).  
 
Mating decisions and sexual conflict over parental investment 
Similar to the results for total parental investment (see above), we also record marked differences in the 
way parental investment is shared among males and females in the different models (Figure 5). However, 
three general patterns hold for all models: first, parental investment is generally more biased towards 
females when polygyny is more common across a population (and this pattern holds within both 
monogamous pairs and polygynous groups). Second, in monogamous pairs, sharing of parental 
investment is unbiased when monogamy prevails in the population, becomes female-biased as floater 
densities decrease during the transition towards polygyny, and becomes more egalitarian again, once 
polygyny is established and floater densities increase (cf. Figure 5A). Third, in polygynous groups, females 
always expend more parental investment than males, albeit to different degrees depending on the mating 
system and female densities (cf. Figure 5B).  
While the shape of the relationship between female density, mating system switches, and sharing 
of parental investment in monogamous pairs is similar for all models (cf. Figure 5A), it is overall more 
female-biased in Models 3 and 4 compared to Models 1 and 2, especially once monogamy ceases to be 
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adaptive. The same is true in polygynous groups (cf. Figure 5B), with the marked exception of joiner 
females suffering from reproductive costs of polygyny (Model 3), which are the lone expenders of parental 
investment, irrespective of the mating system and environmental productivity (𝛾). 
 
Discussion 
We have shown here that applying a demographically explicit, adaptive dynamics approach to the study 
of female mating decisions and parental investment strategies of both sexes allows for insights that 
previous work did not provide. Four general conclusions follow from our framework: 1) In the absence of 
interference among females regarding mating decisions, and where females have identical mortality- and 
fecundity prospects irrespective of their status as either resident, primary female or secondary, joiner 
female in a polygynous group, delaying reproduction to achieve monogamous matings is rarely adaptive 
for females (cf. Model 1 in Figures 2-4). 2) Monogamy is only likely to be favoured in very unproductive 
environments with low density populations, i.e. close to the edge of population extinction (see Figures 2-
4). This is due to reduced competition for solitary males among floating females in low density 
populations, a finding easily missed when demography is not considered or when analyses focus on sex 
ratios alone. 3) The range of parameters over which monogamy is favoured can be markedly increased by 
allowing for either interference by established, resident females with polygynous matings, or by 
introducing costs of polygyny for joining, secondary females (cf. the different size of shaded areas in 
Figures 2-4 between Model 1 versus Models 2-4). 4) Different mechanisms by which monogamy is 
favoured, i.e. either interference by primary females with polygynous matings or reproductive/mortality 
costs of accepting secondary status, predict different patterns of co-evolution between mating and 
parental investment decisions (cf. comparisons between Models 2-4 in Figures 4 & 5). Interference among 
females does little to alter the balance of sexual conflict over male vs female parental investment (cf. 
Models 1 and 2 in Figures 4 & 5), while asymmetries between primary and secondary females generally 
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shift the burden of parental investment away from males and more towards females (compare predictions 
of Models 1 and 2 to those of Models 3 and 4 in Figures 4 & 5). In addition, it matters whether the costs 
of secondary mating status are assumed to arise from increased mortality or from decreased fecundity. 
In the former case, males invest equally in all offspring, whereas in the latter case they invest more heavily 
in offspring of primary mates (compare predictions of Models 3 and 4 in Figures 4B & 5B). 
 
Comparisons with previous theory 
The fact that it is difficult in our basic model (Model 1) to find parameter values that favour monogamy is 
somewhat at odds with the classic work by (Orians 1969) that inspired the setup of our own equations. 
For Orians, monogamy was generally assumed to be the default best choice for females and he sought to 
explain how and why polygyny might be favoured. The two major explanations he offered for the 
existence of polygynous mating were (a) large qualitative differences among males in terms of the 
resources they could provide to the female (cf. ‘environmental quality’ and the ‘polygyny threshold’ in 
Figure 2 in (Orians 1969)), and (b) an absence of paternal care (which would then favour promiscuity to 
obtain genetic benefits, as observed in mammals; (Orians 1969) p. 596 prediction 2). In contrast to Orians’ 
assumptions, however, our Model 1 predicts that females should readily accept earlier polygynous 
breeding rather than delay reproduction to achieve monogamy, and our extensions (Models 2-4) are 
attempts to explain how and why monogamy might evolve. 
While many aspects of our models follow Orians’ ideas (e.g. (i) the general benefit of polygyny to 
males, (ii) the reduced paternal investment (‘care’ in (Orians 1969)) received by polygynous females, and 
(iii) fitness consequences of mating decisions to females being the lone determinant of the mating 
system), there is one marked difference between his work and ours: we set up a demographically explicit 
model, while Orians only made verbal arguments concerning density dependent effects. This becomes 
important, because Orians assumed that rejection of a potential mate would not entail large fitness costs 
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as another mate would readily be available (cf. (Orians 1969) p. 591 condition ‘(b)’). Our models assume, 
however, that when one floating focal individual can easily sample additional mating opportunities at little 
fitness cost (because encounter rate is high and/or floater mortality low), the same will be true of other 
floater females. This increases density of floating females, with the result that few opportunities for 
monogamous mating will remain available for the focal individual to take advantage of. In other words, 
competition among females for monogamous mating opportunities renders polygyny adaptive unless 
population density is very low, an insight that is easily overlooked outside of demographically explicit 
modelling approaches (Kokko and López-Sepulcre 2007). 
Our analysis is certainly not the first to consider demographic factors in an explicit way. For 
instance, ‘time-in / time-out’ models, which usually assume fixed mortality rates for each of the different 
states an individual can be in (that is either ‘in the mating pool’ [i.e. ready to mate] or ‘out of the mating 
pool’ [i.e. not currently ready to mate, because of parental investment expended in the previous mating, 
e.g. performing parental care]), allow for  a scaling factor to capture the impact of different levels of 
fecundity and resulting demographic changes (cf. (Clutton-Brock and Parker 1992), (Fromhage and 
Jennions 2016)). However, such models generally do not consider the effects of interference among 
females (as opposed to competition that arises indirectly via mate availability), nor do they allow for 
potential asymmetries among primary and secondary females (populations are assumed to be 
homogenous and invading mutants to be rare; cf. Methods: Model 1). Consequently, studies of systems 
that show such features have tended to follow more closely the approach of Orians (1969; see e.g. 
(Slagsvold and Lifjeld 1994), (Grønstøl et al. 2003)). Our model, we hope, offers a combined approach that 
allows for interference and asymmetries among females in a demographically explicit framework, in which 
both OSR and ASR emerge dynamically from the model rather than being specified extrinsically (as for 
instance in (Grønstøl et al. 2003)).  
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Implications for empirical work 
From an empiricist’s point of view, our approach may help guide data collection and experimental design. 
First, the fact that 𝛾 (environmental productivity) proved to be important in all our models suggests that 
any investigation of mating systems and parental investment patterns should monitor demographic 
parameters including population density and female mobility/sociality, as well as the more commonly 
studied sex ratio ((Kokko and López-Sepulcre 2007); see also (Lukas and Clutton-Brock 2013) for a recent 
empirical example). While we agree that the ASR is an important ecological factor when investigating 
mating systems and parental investment (cf. (Kokko and Jennions 2008)), we follow (Fromhage and 
Jennions 2016) in their conclusion that ‘[…] explanations for the relationship between the ASR and the 
proportion of care given by males that invoked a direct causal role for the ASR are misleading’ ((Fromhage 
and Jennions 2016) p. 2). Rather, interactions between parental investment, mating decisions, and sex 
ratios should be investigated together with demography (broadly interpreted), without a priori 
assumptions about causality. Second, where either costs of polygyny to females or patterns of parental 
investment cannot easily be measured, our models allow inferences about one from observations of the 
other. For example, where polygynous males invest in the offspring of resident (primary) and joiner 
(secondary) females equally, there are unlikely to be fecundity costs to females associated with accepting 
polygyny (and vice versa; cf. Figure 5). Our models may thus help to reveal characteristics of animal 
breeding systems that are hard to assess directly. Third, because our models allow for the implementation 
of different functions to describe the relationships between parental investment, reproduction, and 
mortality, they may serve as analytical tools to unravel these in empirical systems. By running the models 
with different functions and comparing their outcomes with empirical data, one can identify those 
functions that best describe the recorded real-world data as likely to be a closer fit to the actual trade-
offs that hold in a particular study system. 
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For example, in pied flycatchers, reproductive costs of polygyny to females, especially to joiners 
(i.e. secondary females), have been reported, but no survival costs were detected (Huk and Winkel 2006). 
This situation is equivalent to our Model 3. (Huk and Winkel 2006) did not find any evidence of 
compensation to joiner females from direct (i.e. survival or reproduction) or indirect (i.e. genetic quality 
indicated by grand offspring performance) fitness consequences. This begs the question why females 
should ever engage in polygyny in this system. Our models suggest that accepting the costs of polygyny 
may pay females, if competition for males is high enough and/or environmental conditions are favourable, 
increasing the relative costs of delaying reproduction (cf. Figures 2 & 3). Testing whether the frequency 
of polygyny is indeed correlated with population density or average reproductive success either on 
temporal or geographic scales may thus allow us to explain seemingly maladaptive mating decisions 
(Hasselquist 1998), (Herényi et al. 2014). 
 
Future modelling possibilities 
Our models rely on numerous simplifying assumptions that are at times at odds with real-world 
observations, and that might be relaxed or modified in future analyses. Four of these simplifications are 
especially note-worthy: First, we allow only one sex to make decisions about mating, which is likely to be 
unrealistic (Davies 1989). For example, acorn woodpeckers (Koenig et al. 1984), dunnocks (Davies 1985), 
lesser spotted woodpeckers (Wiktander et al. 2000), and penduline tits (Persson and Öhrström 1989) have 
all been reported to simultaneously exhibit various forms of mating within the same population, 
suggesting that both sexes may often be choosey with regards to mating decisions (Parker 2006). Second, 
we limit polygyny to a situation where two females are paired with one male, i.e. the OSR can only vary 
between 1/2 and 1/3 (proportion of males among all breeding individuals). In many polygamous systems, 
however, much more extreme values of the OSR are observed (e.g. elephant seals (McCann 1980), 
pipefish (Vincent et al. 1994), primates (Mitani et al. 1996)). Third, other than the differences in territory- 
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and mate acquisition, we assume males and females to be identical, which is obviously different from real 
animal systems where (i) females by definition invest into larger gametes (Liker et al. 2015), (ii) the sexes 
often differ in their physiological ability to invest into offspring (e.g. gestation and lactation in mammals), 
or (iii) face different limits to their reproductive life span (Heinze 2016).  Fourth, we omit certain ecological 
factors that have been shown to influence parenting and mating decisions, for example spatial or 
temporal clustering of mates or resources and the costs of territoriality (Ah-King et al. 2005), (Wong et al. 
2012). Some of these limitations could potentially be addressed by either using different reproduction- or 
mortality functions (e.g. introducing different scaling factors of parental investment for males and 
females) or by extending the models (e.g. allowing more females to settle per territory or introducing a 
temporal structure). However, such work is outside of the scope of the current manuscript.  
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Figure 1: Schematic overview of the model, highlighting the ways in which frequencies of territory types 
and densities of floaters (and consequently numbers of males and females) change. Throughout the text, 
densities of male and female floaters are denoted as 𝐿𝑚 and 𝐿𝑓, respectively. The frequencies of breeding 
territories with a solitary male (no female), a monogamous pair, and a polygynous group are denoted in 
the text as 𝐵0, 𝐵1, and 𝐵2, respectively. Densities of floating males decrease when floaters die (1; at rate 
µ𝑚𝐿𝐿𝑚), when solitary males die and floaters acquire their territory (2; at rate µ𝑚𝐵0𝐵0), when 
monogamous males die and floaters acquire their territory (3; at rate µ𝑚𝐵1𝐵1), or when polygynous males 
die and floaters acquire their territory (4; at rate µ𝑚𝐵2𝐵2). Densities of floating males increase when 
surviving male offspring are produced by a female in a monogamous pair (5; at rate 𝜃𝛾𝐵1𝐵1), or by a 
female in a polygynous group (6; at rate 2𝜃𝛾𝐵2𝐵2). Densities of floating females decrease when floaters 
die (7; at rate µ𝑓𝐿𝐿𝑓), when floating females encounter a solitary male and join it to form a monogamous 
pair (8; at rate 𝜀̂𝐿𝑓𝐵0), and when floating females encounter a monogamous pair and decide to join it to 
form a polygynous group (9; at rate 𝜀̂𝐿𝑓𝐵1𝐽). Densities of floating females increase when surviving female 
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offspring are produced by a female in a monogamous pair (10; at rate (1 − 𝜃)𝛾𝐵1𝐵1), or by a female in a 
polygynous group (11; at rate 2(1 − 𝜃)𝛾𝐵2𝐵2). The frequency of territories with a solitary male decreases 
when floating females encounter solitary males and join them to form a monogamous pair (8; at rate 
𝜀̂𝐿𝑓𝐵0). The frequency of territories with a solitary male increases when females in monogamous pairs 
die (12; at rate µ𝑓𝐵1𝐵1). The frequency of territories with monogamous pairs decreases when females in 
monogamous pairs die (12; at rate µ𝑓𝐵1𝐵1), and when floating females encounter monogamous pairs and 
join them to form a polygynous group (9; at rate 𝜀̂𝐿𝑓𝐵1𝐽). The frequency of territories with a monogamous 
pair increases when floating females encounter solitary males and join them to form a monogamous pair 
(8; at rate 𝜀̂𝐿𝑓𝐵0), and when females in polygynous groups die (13; at rate 2µ𝑓𝐵2𝐵2). The frequency of 
territories with a polygynous group decreases when females in polygynous groups die (13; at rate 
2µ𝑓𝐵2𝐵2). The frequency of territories with polygynous groups increases when floating females encounter 
monogamous pairs and decide to join them to form a polygynous group (9; at rate 𝜀̂𝐿𝑓𝐵1𝐽). 
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Figure 2: The influence of environmental productivity (x-axis in both panels: log 𝛾) on (A) female mating 
decisions and (B) the adult sex ratio (ASR; proportion of males) for all four models. In (A) solid lines 
represent selected joining probabilities of floating females, in (B) solid lines represent the ASR. Horizontal 
thin grey lines indicate joining indifference (A; 𝐽 = 0.5) and an even ASR (B; 50% males). Vertical dashed 
lines indicate the value of 𝛾 at which monogamy ceases to be adaptive for females, and shaded areas 
represent the range of values of 𝛾 for which 𝐽 < 0.5 (i.e. adaptive monogamy) is observed. 
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Figure 3: The proportion of adults floating for males (A) and females (B) along the environmental 
productivity gradient (x-axis in both panels: log 𝛾) for all four models. Values close to 0 indicate that most 
individuals are breeding, a value of 0.5 indicates that there is one floater per breeder (thin grey lines), and 
a value close to 1 indicates that most individuals float. Solid lines represent the proportion of floaters, 
dashed lines indicate the value of 𝛾 at which monogamy ceases to be adaptive for females, and shaded 
areas represent the range of values of 𝛾 for which 𝐽 < 0.5 (i.e. adaptive monogamy) is observed. 
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Figure 4: The total parental investment in (A) monogamous pairs and (B) polygynous groups as a function 
of the mating system for all four models. The mating system is characterised as the proportion of breeding 
males that are mated polygynously (x-axis). Thus, an x-value of 0 represents a purely monogamous 
population, while a value of 1 indicates a purely polygynous one. In both graphs, vertical dashed lines 
indicate the proportion of polygynously mated males at the point at which monogamy ceases to be 
adaptive for females, and shaded areas represent the range of proportions of polygynously mated males 
for which 𝐽 < 0.5 (i.e. adaptive monogamy) is observed. In (A) solid lines represent total parental 
investment (paternal investment + maternal investment). In (B) solid lines represent total parental 
investment received by offspring of resident females, and dashed-and-dotted lines represent total 
parental investment received by offspring of joiner females. 
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Figure 5: The proportion of total parental investment (PI) expended by females in (A) monogamous pairs 
and in (B) polygynous groups as a function of female density (x-axis; floating females per breeding female). 
Thus, an x-value near 0 represents low density and most adult females breeding, a value near 1 represents 
high density and the majority of adult females floating.  Similarly, a y-value of 1 indicates the female being 
the lone expender of PI, a value of 0.5 indicates perfectly egalitarian sharing among males and females 
(grey lines), and a value of 0 indicates the male being the lone expender of PI. In both graphs, large circles 
represent those points at which monogamy ceases to be adaptive for females. Consequently, solid and 
dashed-and-dotted lines represent areas in which monogamy is adaptive (𝐽 < 0.5), while dotted lines 
represent areas in which polygyny is adaptive (𝐽 > 0.5). In (A) solid and dotted lines represent a breeding 
female’s share of total PI. In (B) solid lines represent the share of total PI for resident females, and dashed-
and-dotted lines represent the share of total PI for joiner females (dotted lines give the respective values 
for 𝐽 > 0.5, cf. above). 
